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Abstract—Modern warfare’s situation awareness and opera-
tion planning requires analyzing a vast amount of informa-
tion, ranging broadly from intelligence reports to data from
autonomous sensors. Correctly assessing the credibility of such
information in a timely manner is as crucial to decision making as
being able to obtain the information in the ﬁrst place. However,
manual information quality assessment is time-consuming and
laborious, especially considering the amount of information that
modern automated knowledge solutions can deliver.
In this paper, we present a novel trust framework called the
Personalized Trust Framework (PTF), which can assist military
analysts to automate their trust evaluation process, and, as a
result, signiﬁcantly lighten the burden of information quality
assessment. In other words, it provides a mechanism for end users
to capture their trust reasoning in order for it to be automated
by computers. In particulars, a user can specify how he selects
a trust model based on information about the subject whose
trustworthiness he needs to evaluate and how that trust model is
conﬁgured. This trust evaluation process is then automated by the
PTF making use of the trust models that can be ﬂexibly plugged
into the PTF by the user. By so doing, the PTF enable users
to reuse and to personalize existing trust models to suit their
requirements without having to reprogram them. Finally, this
paper demonstrates a simple application of the PTF in automated
credibility evaluation to ensure information quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern warfare’s situation awareness and operation plan-
ning requires analyzing a vast amount of information, ranging
broadly from intelligence reports to data from autonomous
sensors. In addition, the advent of network-enabled capabilities
and the growth of the Internet as a medium for informa-
tion dissemination have made much more information from
external agencies accessible to military analysts than it has
hitherto been possible. This is a boon but also a burden.
It is a boon because more information potentially affords
better situation awareness. It is a burden because military
analysts will have to cope with the ever increasing quantity of
information. One of the challenges is that not every piece of
information obtained is useful. Information content may vary
with respect to a number of information quality criteria (e.g.
accuracy, relevance, usability, etc.) [1]. Not all information
providers are qualiﬁed to provide information; neither are
their information offerings always benign. These issues are
particularly important in competitive decision-making contexts
where there is a strong possibility of adversarial agencies
disseminating false or misleading information in an effort to
subvert friendly decision making processes. With the ever-
increasing availability of information, ensuring information
quality becomes a great challenge since manual assessment
is time-consuming and laborious. Hence, there needs to be an
automated solution for information quality assessment to cope
with the increased workload.
Quality assessment of a piece of information can be broadly
divided into two sub-problems: evaluating the trustworthiness
of the information provider and examining the validity of the
information itself. The former aims to evaluate the credibility
of the information from assessing the information provider in
various aspects such as its reliability (e.g. the error margin of a
sensor), its motives (e.g. how willing the provider is to reveal
the information honestly), and so on. The latter is concerned
with the logic and the factuality of the information content.
For example, an analyst can corroborate the new facts provided
with his domain knowledge and previously conﬁrmed facts to
derive how likely the new information is true. Automating
this task requires a computer be able to fully understand the
facts presented in the information. However, as the majority
of information exchanged nowadays is typically unstructured
and has no well-deﬁned semantics, this requirement is usually
infeasible with current technologies (particularly when the
knowledge domain concerned is unconstrained and has no
clear boundary). Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the for-
mer sub-problem: to automate trust evaluation of information
providers.
Trust research in computer science has recently generated
numerous computational trust models (see [2] and [3] for some
examples). The main goal of these models is typically to
capture the trust dynamics in human societies and replicate
it (along with its beneﬁts) in computer environments. In
other words, they aim to automate the human trust evaluation
process by delegating this task to computers. Despite the
abundance of available trust models, their adoption has been
limited. The main reason is that existing trust models typically
make assumptions about the availability of particular types of
information they require (for their evaluation) and, as a result,
do not generalize well to a different application domain than
those they were designed for. Therefore, although some might
work well within their target domains, none of them is ready
for generic applications. Such limitation is understandable
(and expected). Trust models are domain dependent becausethey rely on various information about the trust subjects—
the entities whose trustworthiness is being evaluated—which
varies with different types of subject and is typically unique
within a particular application domain. For instance, evaluating
the trustworthiness of a sensor requires the examination of
(signiﬁcantly) different genres of information than those when
evaluating the trustworthiness of an online news agency. In
addition, trust, by nature, is subjective [4], and even for the
same application, each person has their own view about how
trust should be modeled in that application’s domain. There-
fore, mainstream users have yet to adopt existing trust models
(with the exception of very simplistic models like eBay’s
[5]) since they cannot adapt a computational trust model to
sufﬁciently match their mental ones (i.e. change its behavior)
without resorting to re-programming it. This is cumbersome
and requires the end users to understand the internal working
of particular trust models. In addition, different trust models
use different trust representations that are an inherent part of
their mathematical underpinnings. Some examples are: trust
labels (e.g. very trustworthy, trustworthy, untrustworthy, very
untrustworthy [6]), scalar numbers (e.g. a real number in
[ 1;1] [7]), probability density function [8], etc. An end user
might not be familiar with any of these variants except the one
that his organization has already been using. Therefore, results
produced by trust models, where possible, should be converted
into a customized representation that can be accepted and
shared by end users from a particular organization.
Against this background, in this paper, we presents a novel
framework called the Personalized Trust Framework (PTF)
that facilitates the utilization of existing trust models by
allowing different trust models to be ﬂexibly plugged into the
framework and customized by end users. The PTF provides a
number of notable capabilities. First, it enables end users to
control the trust evaluation process by deﬁning which trust
models will be used in which circumstances and in what
ways. Second, end users can deﬁne their own trust value
representation and how trust values of a different representa-
tion are automatically converted to theirs. Third, all such user
personalization is stored in a trust proﬁle, which can be easily
transferred to other users for reuse. Customizations to the trust
evaluation can be made via editing the trust proﬁle without
having to reprogram the PTF. Finally, in addition to the above,
despite the high automation of trust evaluation afforded by the
PTF, end users will still maintain a degree of control over the
process. For example, they can trace how an automated trust
decision was arrived at by examining its provenance recorded
by the PTF. The framework will also notify the users of any
abnormality (for example when it cannot produce a reliable
trust value) and prompt for user intervention in order to correct
this.
For the purpose of illustrating the design and concepts of the
PTF in this paper, we will discuss the application of the PTF
for the problem of evaluating the credibility of intelligence in-
formation by military analysts. The PTF is particularly suitable
for this problem because the variety of intelligence information
(e.g. open-source intelligence, human intelligence, and signal
intelligence) requires different approaches to trust evaluation
depending on the type of information being evaluated. In this
particular domain, information reliability is rated using the
Intelligence Source Reliability rating [9], which uses labels
from A to F to denote the reliability of the intelligence source.
A means ‘Reliable’, B ‘Usually reliable’, C ‘Fairly reliable’,
D ‘Not usually reliable’, E ‘Unreliable’, and F ‘Cannot be
judged’.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the PTF and its components. Section III then
discusses related work. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper
and outlines potential future work.
II. THE PERSONALIZED TRUST FRAMEWORK
As introduced in the previous section, the PTF is designed
to automate the trust evaluation process by providing a mech-
anism for human users to capture their trust reasoning process
in order for it to be automated by computers. The focus of
this paper is, therefore, on developing such a mechanism, not
on trust modeling (which has already been the focus of much
research recently). Hence, it is assumed that end users will
provide the trust models they want to automate (which can
be selected from the many available models, such as those
reviewed in [2] and [3]) and plug them into the PTF in real-
world applications. At a more detailed level, the PTF aims to
address the following issues:
 How a user can deﬁne his trust model selection strategy,
i.e. matching a trust subject to be evaluated with a suitable
trust model.
 How an arbitrary trust model can be instantiated and used
by the framework.
 How trust values of different representations can be
transformed into a common representation.
In order to cater a wide range of applications, the PTF makes
extensive use of semantic web technologies (like ontology-
based representation and reasoning) [10], which allow infor-
mation to be represented in a machine-understandable format,
to enable the PTF’s information processing capabilities to be
extensible to any application domain. More details on this will
be provided in the subsequent sections.
In the next section, we present how trust evaluation is
carried out in the PTF (Section II-A). We will then discuss
about the main components of the PTF: the Trust Manager
(Section II-B), converters (Section II-C), and trust engines
(Section II-D). Since trust evaluation may have a signiﬁcant
impact on critical military decisions, Section II-E shows how
the provenance of every trust decision is recorded for future
auditing.
A. An Overview of the PTF
The PTF makes use of existing trust models to evaluate the
trustworthiness of trust subjects sent to it. In the context of
intelligence information, a trust subject is a piece of informa-
tion that needs to be evaluated to determine its reliability. For
the sake of simplicity, we will subsequently be using the term
“document” to refer to any piece of information to be assessed(
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Fig. 1. The trust evaluation process by PTF.
independently by the framework. The PTF is controlled by a
software component called the Trust Manager, which oversees
the trust evaluation work ﬂow in the framework (Figure 1). The
normal ﬂow of execution is as follows:
1) A document is sent to the Trust Manager along with its
meta-data (1), such as its document type, content type,
originator, referee, etc.
2) The Trust Manager matches the document’s meta-data
with its trust proﬁle to determine a suitable trust model
to be used. A corresponding trust engine—an imple-
mentation of the selected trust model—is initialized
with appropriate parameters as speciﬁed by the trust
proﬁle. The engine then evaluates the document’s trust-
worthiness (2a).
3) The selected trust engine, depending on which trust
model it implements, will derive the trust value of the
document from its meta-data using rules, from previous
experiences with its provider, or from referrals from
trusted sources. The trust value is then returned back
to the main application (3a).
This normal ﬂow is automated without human intervention.
However, if the Trust Manager detects exceptions in the
process, it will notify the user. The main exceptions are: the
Trust Manager cannot select a trust model based on the policy
in its trust proﬁle (2b), when it receives a document of an
unknown type, for instance; and the selected trust engine is not
conﬁdent that it produced a reliable trust evaluation (3b), for
example when it has no information, or too little information,
for its evaluation. The user can then examine the document and
decide on its trustworthiness (4). Where possible, the user can
also add new rules or update the ones in his trust proﬁle so
that the Trust Manager will know how to deal with similar
cases in the future (5).
As mentioned above, semantic technologies allow the PTF
to be extensible to new types of information without limitation.
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Fig. 2. The PTF’s components.
This is achievable thanks to the central role of the PTF
ontology, which deﬁnes the building blocks of the PTF and
provides the core language elements for specifying trust pro-
ﬁles. The PTF ontology is represented in OWL1. New concepts
(described in OWL) that are extended from, or can be mapped
to, those in the PTF ontology are automatically supported by
the PTF (hence its unlimited extensibility). The PTF ontology
will be introduced in part along with the corresponding PTF
components in the subsequent sections.
B. The Trust Manager
The PTF’s Trust Manager is responsible for coordinating
the trust evaluation process according to the policy in a trust
proﬁle provided by end users (see the relationships of the Trust
Manager with the other PTF components in Fig. 2). The trust
proﬁle is described in OWL using the concepts provided by the
PTF ontology. Essentially, it contains a set of rules specifying
how documents sent to the Trust Manager are classiﬁed and
which trust engines are used to evaluate those documents. It
also contains concepts (i.e. OWL classes) of the information
domain concerned, enabling the Trust Manager to understand
information fed to it from that domain. In order to execute the
rules speciﬁed in the trust proﬁle, the Trust Manager uses the
Jena Rule Engine2 [13]. It operates broadly as follows (see
1OWL Web Ontology Language: a standard of the World Wide Web
Consortium, http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/.
2JENA is a popular open-source Semantic Web Framework for Java. It
provides libraries for working semantic web data (e.g. RDF and OWL) in
various ways. For more details, see [11]. In the reference implementation of
the PTF, the Jena Rule Engine is used because it supports both OWL entail-
ments and reasoning on generic rules in one single engine with reasonable
performance. As a result, we must use the Jena’s rule format for writing
rules. From our review, SWRL [12], an emerging rule language standard for
semantic web (submitted to the World Wide Web consortium in 2004), offers
better expressivity and simplicity than Jena’s rule format. However, SWRL’s
reasoning support has yet sufﬁciently matured for our reasoning requirements
and, thus, we decided to use Jena rule engine until a better candidate emerges.hasTrustTerm
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Fig. 3 for the PTF ontology’s classes that are referenced in
italics):
1) Initially, the Trust Manager loads the PTF ontology and
the trust proﬁle into the rule engine. It then connects the
rule engine with the Datastore, a RDF triple store con-
taining all the knowledge that the system has recorded.
2) For each document sent to the Trust Manager, it loads
the document’s metadata into the rule engine for rea-
soning against the rules in the trust proﬁle and the
knowledge in the Datastore.
3) If the reasoning process results in one or more new
trust evaluation jobs (stored in an instance of the Ap-
praisalJob class), the Trust Manager loads the relevant
instances of the TrustEngine class (see Section II-D for
more details) and sends the jobs to those engines.
4) The results, in the form of instances of the TrustAp-
praisal class, will be returned to the main application.
In order to illustrate the process above, consider a scenario
where online news articles (as open-source intelligence) are
collected and evaluated on their reliability using the Intelli-
gence Source Reliability rating. In this scenario, each Docu-
ment instance represents an online news article. The meta-data
accompanying a Document contains only the URL (i.e. the
web address) of the original article. For instance, we have the
following documents:
URI hasURL
demo:DocBBC1 news.bbc.co.uk/1/.../7219312.stm
demo:DocAJ1 english.aljazeera.net/...925381.html
In the trust proﬁle, we deﬁne the classes Agent, Organiza-
tion, Person, and WebProvider, and a property hasOrginator
(see Fig. 3), allowing us to represent the fact that a document is
originated from an agent, which can be a person, an organiza-
tion, or a web provider. The trust proﬁle also has a number of
instances of Organization class: BBC, Al Jazeera. In addition,
each organization has a property called hasURLPattern to store
the pattern of the addresses of web pages published by it.
For classifying the documents in this scenario, three rules are
added to the trust proﬁle:
1) Rule ClassifyWebProviders:
(?org rdf:type ptf:Organization)
(?org ptf:hasURLPattern ?pattern)
! (?org rdf:type ptf:WebProvider)
This rule, written in the Jena’s rule format, states that
if an organization ?org has the property hasURL-
Pattern asserted then ?org is an instance of the class
WebProvider. From now on, for the sake of simplicity,
we will only explain what a rule does and omit the rule’s
(usually lengthy) deﬁnition in Jena’s rule syntax.
2) Rule URLPatternOriginator: If the URL of a document
matches an organization’s URL pattern then the docu-
ment must have been originated from that organization.
3) Rule WebDocumentEngineSelector: If a document was
originated by a WebProvider then create an AppraisalJob
to evaluate the document on the Term Intelligence
Reliability using the engine WebProviderRuleBased-
Engine and the job must return a trust value from the
scheme Intelligence Reliability Rating (see Fig. 4).
With these three rules, when DocBBC1 is sent to the Trust
Manager, it can infer that the document was originated from
BBC (Rule 2) and BBC is a WebProvider (Rule 1). Since
DocBBC1 was originated from a WebProvider, an Apprais-
alJob called DocBBC1Job is created for the document to be
evaluated by WebProviderRuleBaseEngine (Fig. 4). In the PTF,
trust subjects are evaluated not on the general trustworthiness
(which is an ambiguous term), but on a speciﬁc trust term.
For instance, the third rule above speciﬁes that the document
will be evaluated on its intelligence reliability (TermIntelli-
genceReliability), which is a custom TrustTerm deﬁned in the
trust proﬁle. Hence, with the PTF, end users can ﬂexibly deﬁne
different trust terms according to their needs and a document
can have multiple trust values on different trust terms (e.g.
honesty, cooperativeness, and so on).
C. Converters
In addition to trust terms, the AppraisalJob in the previous
section also speciﬁes the expected type of the trust value,
namely IntelligenceReliabilityRating. Since the WebProvider-
RuleBaseEngine happens to produce trust values of the type
required (see Fig. 4). The resultant trust value can be returned
to the main application immediately. However, in the case thatresultType
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Fig. 4. DocBBC1Job: an instance of AppraisalJob generated by the Trust
Manager (with the new relationships/facts highlighted).
a trust engine does not produce trust values in the required
representation, the Trust Manager will look for a suitable
converter in the trust proﬁle, and if it ﬁnds one, it will execute
the converter to transform the resultant trust value into the
required representation. If no suitable converter is available,
the Trust Manager will raise an exception and prompt for user
intervention. Therefore, end users should deﬁne necessary con-
verters in the trust proﬁle to enable seamless trust evaluation.
In the PTF, converters can be deﬁned using Jena rules. For
example, consider the FIRE trust model which produces scalar
trust values in the range [ 1;+1], where  1 means absolutely
negative, +1 means absolutely positive, and 0 means neutral.
To translate a trust value using FIRE’s scalar representation
to the Intelligence Reliability rating, we deﬁne a converter in
the trust proﬁle with rules such as “if the FIRE scalar value
is greater than or equal to 0:25 and less than 0:75 then the
Intelligence Reliability rating is B.”
In cases where Jena rules are not sufﬁciently expressive for
the required complex conversion calculations (e.g. converting
from a probability density function as used in [8]), a custom
Java class can be provided with its class name registered in
the trust proﬁle. The Trust Manager will load the Java class
when the converter is required and the custom Java class will
be responsible for the conversion.
D. Trust Engines
Having created appraisal jobs for incoming documents, the
Trust Manager puts the jobs into a queue and executes them
independently. For each job, it loads the speciﬁed trust engine
and sends the job to the engine. A trust engine is identiﬁed
by a unique URI3, for example the URI for the WebProvider-
RuleBasedEngine is ptf:WebProviderRuleBased
3A Uniform Resource Identiﬁer (URI) is a string of characters used to
identify a resource on the Internet.
Engine. The URI is used to locate the trust engine’s speciﬁca-
tion in the trust proﬁle, which helps the Trust Manager know
how to build the engine when required. After a trust engine
is successfully executed, it produces an instance of the class
TrustAppraisal which contains links to the target document,
the resultant trust value, the trust term on which the document
was evaluated, and a conﬁdence value. The conﬁdence value
reﬂects the reliability of the trust value as judged by the
trust engine and is calculated in different ways, depending
on the particular trust model used. The Trust Manager uses
this conﬁdence value to determine if the resultant trust value
can be returned to the main application immediately or a user
decision is needed (based on a preset threshold).
In the PTF, a trust engine is typically provided in a Java
class. A TrustEngine instance in the trust proﬁle then provides
the link to the Java class of the corresponding engine, allowing
the Trust Manager to load the engine when required. An
exception to this is the class RuleBasedTrustEngine, a special
sub-class of TrustEngine. Trust engines of this class use
rules to derive trust values and rely on the Trust Manager’s
rule engine for reasoning capabilities. When building such
engines, the Trust Manager simply loads their rules directly
from the trust proﬁle. Hence, the class RuleBasedTrustEngine
allows end users to build simple trust engines in their trust
proﬁles very quickly. For example, in our evaluation, the
WebProviderRuleBasedEngine is built from the following two
Jena rules:
1) Rule TrustedOrgDefault: If a document originated from
an organization of the class TrustedOrganization then its
Intelligence Reliability rating is B (i.e. ‘usually reliable’)
and the conﬁdence value of this assessment is 0.5.
2) Rule UnknownOrgDefault: If a document was origi-
nated from an unknown organization (i.e. not in the class
TrustedOrganization) then its Intelligence Reliability
rating is F (i.e. ‘cannot be judged’) and the conﬁdence
value of this assessment is 0.5.
Since we asserted in our trust proﬁle that only the BBC is
a TrustedOrganization (Fig. 3), the execution of WebProvider-
RuleBasedEngine on the sample documents in Section II-B
will give rating B to DocBBC1 and rating F for DocAJ1, a
simple and quick classiﬁcation based on the documents’ URLs.
In addition to the above, the PTF ontology also allows users
to deﬁne composite trust engines (class CompositeEngine) that
produce trust values by combining the results of two or more
trust engines (which can even be composite themselves) in
some way. For example, in our reference implementation, we
deﬁned a trust engine called MaxConﬁdenceEngine, which ex-
ecutes the WebProviderRuleBasedEngine and the FIREEngine
(using the FIRE model) on the same document and selects the
result which has the highest conﬁdence value. By so doing,
the MaxConﬁdenceEngine always has a trust value produced
by the simpler WebProviderRuleBasedEngine as a backup in
the cases where the more sophisticated FIREEngine cannot
ﬁnd sufﬁcient evidence to produce a reliable trust value. The
possible way of combining different engines are unlimited.E. Auditing
Since automated trust evaluations may have a signiﬁcant
impact to critical decisions (in military operation planning,
for example), from time to time, end users will need to
know how certain trust values were produced. In the PTF,
this is captured using the class OriginationContext. Each
TrustAppraisal instance produced by the PTF is accompanied
with an OriginationContext instance that records the minimum
following information4:
 Subject: the link to the TrustAppraisal concerned.
 Timestamp: when the evaluation was carried out.
 Agent: the link to the trust engine used (and that to the
converter if the original trust value was converted).
 Originator: the link to the original AppraisalJob that led
to the TrustAppraisal concerned.
In addition to providing a way for end users to trace back
the trust evaluation of a particular document, the information
in an OriginationContext instance can be useful for other
information management purposes. For example, when a user
updates one of his trust engines, trust appraisals produced by
that engine can become outdated or invalidated. The context
associated with those appraisals can help to ﬂag documents
with outdated trust appraisals when they are presented to the
user.
III. RELATED WORK
An automated trust framework that allows trust models of
different types to be used together and allows user personaliza-
tion to the trust evaluation process is a novel idea that has not
been investigated in the current literature. However, a number
of the PTF’s components have some similarities with existing
work in other areas. First, the problem of rules/policy-based
management has been studied extensively in various work (see
[14]), whose focus is mainly on how to apply rules and regula-
tions on various processes (e.g. identity authentication, access
rights, obligations). The PTF’s Trust Manager, however, uses
rules as an extensible means to replicate a human’s reasoning
process (in selecting a suitable trust model). The idea of using
rules for deriving trust (i.e. RuleBasedTrustEngine) is not new
in trust research. Nevertheless, it is usually considered rather
simplistic (and too domain-dependent) and, as a result, most of
trust research has not rigorously investigated this approach. We
agree with this view, but still provide RuleBasedTrustEngine
in the PTF because it provides a simple and useful tool for
normal users who are typically not extensively familiar with
available computational trust models. Such an approach can
also work well in combination with more sophisticated trust
models (using our composite engines, as shown in the previous
section).
In [15], a taxonomy was developed for different types
of reputation (a form of trust value) representation. It also
deﬁned a number of conversion functions to facilitate repu-
tation information exchange between different trust models.
4A trust engine can add extra contextual information to the Origination-
Context of a trust appraisal where applicable.
This work has similarity with the converters in the PTF. The
main difference is that the conversion functions developed in
their work target computational trust models while the PTF’s
converters aim to consolidate different trust representation into
a common, human-deﬁned representation. The work in [15]
can serve as a reference for developing PTF’s converters, but
it cannot replace the end user’s role in this task.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented the PTF, a novel approach to
trust evaluation automation to support information quality
assessment. It is unique in providing mechanisms for end
users to ﬂexibly deﬁne trust engines and to plug in existing
trust models to suit their trust evaluation requirements. Trust
proﬁles in the PTF allow end users to capture their reasoning
process in trust model selection (and controlling the trust eval-
uation in general), in addition to capturing domain knowledge,
and enable computers to automate the process. Moreover, with
the use of semantic technologies, the PTF is extensible to any
information domain and application. Despite being designed
to be automated, the PTF still provides ways for end users to
audit its trust evaluation process. It will also notify the users of
any anomalies and prompt for their interventions. The users
thus still play an important role in this process by making
decisions about trust and actively improving their trust proﬁles,
but only when this is necessary. By doing all the above, the
most important contribution of the PTF, perhaps, is that it
paves the way for existing computational trust models to get
closer to mainstream adoption.
The PTF is a complex framework, which can beneﬁt
from improvements in a number of areas. First, editing trust
proﬁles is currently carried out by ontology editors, which
are, inherently, not tailored for the PTF. Therefore, we plan
to develop intuitive user interfaces that enable end users to
rapidly and efﬁciently create personalized trust evaluation
proﬁles. Second, we will investigate further the reuse of
trust proﬁles. An example reuse scenario can be as follows:
(1) an organization uses a default trust proﬁle to bootstrap
its members’ PTF; (2) each member improves their trust
proﬁle when prompted for decisions by their PTF; (3) the
improvements (i.e. emerging trust evaluation practice) can then
be analyzed and incorporated back into the organization-wide
trust proﬁle. Finally, reasoning over a large dataset stored in a
database back-end (by the Trust Manager) performs poorly as
a result of the vast numbers of database interactions involved.
This is an open research problem that is not particular to the
PTF but affects its performance nevertheless. On this front, we
are exploring a number of caching strategies that selectively
load only a relatively small set of relevant data to computer
memory (before a trust subject is evaluated) for a signiﬁcant
improvement of the reasoning performance yet the correctness
of the reasoning is still maintained.
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